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AbSTRACT: How can it be assumed that an individual is incapable of giving consent or does not give it freely? 
This article analyses three cases handled by the Tribunal of the Roman Rota between 1579 and 1619: the case of a 
nun from the monastery of Odivelas (Portugal) suffering from mental disorders, and two demands for nullification of 
marriage based on the grounds of duress exerted by immediate family; the case of Doña Antonia Portocarrero y 
Cárdenas, of the diocese of Seville, married to Don Felipe de Guzman y Aragón; and the case of Manuel de Meneses 
and Branca de Baredo of the diocese of Coimbra. The testimonies on file relate the words and actions of the main 
parties involved, revealing affects and intentions. Auditors embarked on a complex operation to translate this infor-
mation into the language of the law, in the light of legal experts’ theories on individual responsibility and the nature 
of violence or constraints that may alter freedom of consent. Yet this also encompassed social practices and represen-
tations in which individual behaviours exist. This study illustrates the contrast between judges’ know-how in assess-
ing the absence of consent regarding marriage or religious profession and the fact that these notions were not taken 
into account regarding consent to baptism.
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RESUMEN: Evaluar el consentimiento a través de signos externos. Tres casos de locura, repulsa y amor ante el 
Tribunal de la Rota Romana (1579-1619).- ¿Cómo puede concluirse que un individuo es incapaz de dar su 
consentimiento o que no lo da libremente? Este artículo analiza tres casos tratados por el Tribunal de la Rota Romana 
entre 1579 y 1619: el caso de una monja del monasterio de Odivelas (Portugal) que padecía trastornos mentales, y 
dos demandas de nulidad de matrimonio motivadas por la coacción ejercida por la familia inmediata; el caso de 
Doña Antonia Portocarrero y Cárdenas, de la diócesis de Sevilla, casada con Don Felipe de Guzmán y Aragón; y el 
caso de Manuel de Meneses y Branca de Baredo, de la diócesis de Coimbra. Los testimonios registrados relatan las 
palabras y acciones de las partes implicadas, revelando afectos e intenciones. En estos procesos, los auditores em-
prendieron una compleja operación de traducción de dicha información al lenguaje legal, apoyándose en el ejemplo 
de expertos juristas y sus teorías sobre la responsabilidad individual y la naturaleza del tipo de violencia o coacción 
necesaria para alterar el libre consentimiento. Sin embargo, es necesario tener en cuenta que estas situaciones abar-
caban también las prácticas sociales y representaciones en las que todo comportamiento individual se ven inmerso. 
Este estudio ilustra el contraste entre la pericia de los jueces a la hora de evaluar la ausencia de consentimiento en 
relación al matrimonio o la profesión de fe, y el hecho de que estas nociones no eran tenidas en cuenta a la hora de 
estimar el consentimiento para el bautismo.
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Since consent involves the intimate dimension of the 
individual, his ability to deliberate independently, and his 
capacity for self-reliance, it provides an excellent insight 
into the shaping of self-consciousness in the 16th and 17th 
centuries. To enter into this subject, to use the various 
ego-documents1, which address individual subjectivity in 
all its complexity, appears necessary. On the contrary, 
however, I propose considering the question of consent 
from the point of view of the authorities of the Catholic 
Church, and using legal sources. For the Church, individ-
ual consent was an important question which has given 
rise to many theoretical reflections and practical case 
studies. According to Catholic theology, consent is neces-
sary for baptism, marriage, and the ordination of priests, 
as well as for religious profession. The starting point of 
the present study, which follows a previous research on 
the forced conversion of Muslims and Moriscos in 16th 
century Spain2, is the hypothesis that, at that time, canon-
ical law allowed two conceptions of consent to coexist (to 
baptism on one hand, to marriage and religious vows on 
the other hand), in which the place given to individual in-
teriority was dramatically different. Consent to baptism 
was regulated according to standards originating in the 
forced conversion of the Jews under Visigoth King Sise-
but in the 7th century, and consolidated in the context of 
the persecution of the Jews in Western Europe in the last 
centuries of Middle Ages. Based on the principle that 
“forced consent is consent” (coacta voluntas, voluntas 
est), doctors (theologians and canonists) considered that 
individual consent was effective, and that baptism was 
therefore valid, as long as the individual did not expressly 
and vociferously demonstrate his refusal to be baptized. 
Pressures, threats and physical violence were not the rec-
ommended means of obtaining conversions, but they 
were not strictly prohibited either; followed by princes, 
the Church accepted the results3. If reception of baptism 
was in principle to be preceded by a period of instruction, 
the conversions carried out during the riots against Jews 
and Muslims, especially in Spain from the end of the 14th 
century, were considered valid even though verification 
of consent was reduced to its simplest expression: acqui-
escence, even silence, in response to the priest’s question 
“Wilt thou be baptized?”4. The drama surrounding the 
conversos and the Moriscos largely entailed the disjunc-
tion between the canonical norm, which received them 
under the jurisdiction of the Church and required them to 
observe its practices even when their consent had been 
extorted, and their private sentiments, which refused this 
forced membership. The regime of consent to baptism 
was thus characterised by its harsh view of the individu-
al’s true aspirations. For centuries, the desire to integrate 
“infidels” into the Church had taken priority over the 
question of the sincerity of their adherence to the Chris-
tian faith5.
At the end of the 16th century, this canonical heritage 
seemed increasingly irreconcilable with another approach 
of consent, that which tended to prevail for marriage and 
religious profession, and will be the focus of our attention 
in this study. The Council of Trent does not mention the 
question of consent to baptism or priestly ordination, but 
it paid great attention to individual consent regarding 
marriage and entry into religion, which directly con-
cerned the lives of families. While the Lutherans rejected 
the sacramental character of marriage and, to avoid clan-
destine marriages, extended the notion of consent to par-
ents and the community, the Council of Trent recalled 
that the validity of marriage rests solely on the voluntary 
mutual consent of man and woman; it was therefore ex-
empted from parental control – even if the Tametsi De-
cree (24th session, c.1) made legal forms for the publicity 
of marriage compulsory6. On the other hand, in order to 
reaffirm the value of consecrated life and, in particular, of 
the contemplative life of women, the Council cast anathe-
mas against those who forced a woman to enter the mon-
astery, receive the habit or pronounce her vows (25th Ses-
sion, c.18). The affirmation of these principles stemmed 
from a theology which considered that consecrated life 
and, to a lesser extent, marriage were states of life capa-
ble of leading to salvation. In practice, their application 
raised many difficulties which were mainly related to ver-
ification of consent.
In marriage and religious profession, consent was ex-
pressed by words and then ratified by acts, that is, respec-
tively, fleshly consecration of the union of spouses and 
observance of the monastic rule. The free will of the indi-
vidual could therefore be deployed in a sacramental and 
ritualised act, and then for the duration of the couple’s 
union or life in the convent. However, lack of consent 
was a ground to nullify the sacrament or a religious pro-
fession. The women and men concerned could appeal to 
the ecclesiastical courts under certain conditions in order 
to obtain recognition that their freedom had not been re-
spected, and that they had been subjected to violence or 
pressure. If the court recognised that these acts had been 
such as to impair freedom of consent, the marriage or 
profession was declared null and void, and the applicant 
was released from any relationship with his spouse or 
with the religious community. Although covering only lo-
cal situations, recent works suggest that numerous pro-
ceedings are kept in the archives of the ecclesiastical 
courts for the 16th-18th centuries, and that judicial conflict 
associated with this issue of freedom of consent was sig-
nificant7.
How can it be assumed that an individual is incapable 
of giving consent or does not give it freely? What I pro-
pose here is to see how the Tribunal of the Sacred Roman 
Rota tackled this question, and to what extent it endeav-
oured to expose the depths of consciences in responding 
to demands for annulment of religious profession or mar-
riage. This pontifical court judged on appeal civil cases, 
many of which about the benefits of the Church; a lesser 
number concerned the validity of religious vows or mar-
riage8. In the 17th century, most of these cases came from 
Italy, Spain and Portugal, sometimes from Lorraine or 
Poland. Gallican France did not resort to this Tribunal, 
the incarnation of Roman authority. Due to the cost of 
the proceedings, the parties (excepting the Roman ones) 
were usually members of the social elites. Without pre-
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senting the Rota in detail9, it should be emphasised that it 
derived its immense prestige and great authority from its 
proximity to the Pope and the quality of its judges, an 
international college of twelve Auditors renowned for 
their competence and integrity as legal experts. Each 
case was entrusted by a letter from the Pope or the 
Vice-Chancellor to one of the Auditors, who became the 
rapporteur (ponente) thereof. With the help of his assis-
tants, the rapporteur would examine the file prepared by 
both parties, that translated the facts into the language of 
the law. Then, during one of the court sittings which took 
place about twice a week from October to the beginning 
of July, he would propose to the four Auditors sitting on 
his left (his corresponsales) a question (dubium) relating 
to the merits of the case or a procedural issue. These Au-
ditors replied in the affirmative or negative by a vote. 
When the different aspects of the case had been carefully 
discussed, the Rota produced a decision which could be 
considered definitive and acceptable for both parties. 
This last decision, then, was converted into a sentence 
that confirmed or rejected the judgement given in first in-
stance. The losing party could still seek a review of the 
decision by the Rota itself, under the supervision of an-
other rapporteur. With the exception of the Auditors’ de-
liberations, which were not public, proceedings were 
written without any physical contact between the Audi-
tors and the parties or the witnesses, and without any ad-
versarial debate. Both parties’ lawyers contacted the 
court with briefs presenting arguments in favour of their 
client. At the request of one of the parties, the Rota could 
grant approval to conduct an inquiry at the place of the 
dispute with witnesses. The testimonies collected by the 
local judge for the Roman Rota were then filtered by 
lawyers and formatted for use as evidence10. Thus, the 
proceedings kept the parties at a distance – a distance 
both geographical and symbolic in nature.
In the second half of the 16th century, the Auditors be-
gan publishing, in the form of large volumes, collections 
of decisions issued on cases where they had been rappor-
teurs. These collections, circulated at Catholic level, 
were to serve in the training of diocesan judges in par-
ticular who heard cases of forced marriages and forced 
vocations at first instance. The apparatus surrounding the 
text of the decisions clearly shows that they were to help 
to build case law. Each decision is easily identifiable by 
an indication of the place of the case, the matter dealt 
with and the date of issue of the decision. It is preceded 
by a summary which brings successive points of the text 
back to principles of universally applicable law. The 
facts are heavily summarised. Nominative information is 
rare, sometimes absent, with the exception of straightfor-
ward first names. Witnesses are usually designated by 
numbers, and testimonies are reduced to a few signifi-
cant sentences. The Roman Rota’s decisions thus offer 
the historian highly abstract and stylised material, much 
more austere than documentation kept on file in the dioc-
esan tribunals.
To determinate the validity of consent to marriage or 
religious profession, Auditors tried to trace the genealo-
gy of each case by establishing the overall situational 
context. Documentation also contains evidence which is 
more subtle, but once gathered, completes the family his-
tories: acts, words and writings that refer to the family 
intimacy of noble circles. All such information is trans-
lated into the language of law; the facts are filtered and 
interpreted to support the judicial decision. I shall first 
analyse a case of madness, which raises the problem of 
impaired capacity for consent. I shall then examine two 
cases of marriage that raise the issue of unauthorised 
consent.
IMPAIRED CONSCIOUSNESS
On 22 June 1579, the Auditors examined the case of a 
Portuguese nun, Margarida, whose brother, Luis Alvares, 
contested the validity of her profession on the grounds 
that she was mad. The opposing party, Antonio Telles, 
took the opposite view in arguing that Margarida’s mental 
state had enabled her to declare her vows in a valid man-
ner. The family history is not clear. I shall confine myself 
to the very brief information noted in the decision of the 
Rota. Margarida came from an aristocratic family. It is 
evidenced by the conditions of her admission to the Fran-
ciscan monastery of Nossa Senhora da Esperança in Lis-
bon, through the intervention of the superior, Cardinal-
Infante Henri, who became King of Portugal in 1578. As 
the Franciscans had refused to admit her to the profession 
after her novitiate, she had entered the Cistercian monas-
tery of São Dinis de Odivelas, a house near Lisbon inhab-
ited by about a hundred nuns, most of them daughters of 
the high Portuguese nobility. Obviously, some members 
of her family wanted to see Margarida kept in a cloister 
and used their social influence for this purpose. They 
were able to mobilise Cardinal-Infante Henry before 
placing her with the Cistercians after the failure to join 
the Franciscans. There they managed to have the novitiate 
reduced to three days instead of the obligatory year, in 
spite of the Abbess’s reluctance to receive a woman who 
in her words was notoriously mad and who had been re-
fused by La Esperança for this reason. Between the two 
chapters of religious life, it seems that Margarida’s broth-
er had considered marrying her and that her mental state 
was considered dangerous for the family’s good repute. 
When the case reached the Roman Rota, the profession at 
Odivelas already dated back several years. It would take 
another two meetings, in May 1580, to finally settle the 
case.
Where the Auditors had difficulty was in characteris-
ing the nun’s disorderly conduct based on the testimonies 
on file. Without being constantly delirious and agitated 
(furiosam), she was still lacking in sanity. Her behaviour 
defined her reputation in both institutions for she was 
considered “insane and demented” (insana et demente) 
and “idiotic” (stulta). She said that she was unwell from a 
hair, that a face would appear to her in a hole, that she 
saw a Moorish magician, and that she didn’t know wheth-
er she was going to commune, wash her hands or recite 
the Prime Office. Moreover,
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She went to the choir in her shirt [...]. She would smear 
her face with mud saying that she was doing it because 
her nostrils were very bright. [...] She would sweep the 
house with the sleeves of her tunic [...]. She would put her 
excrement on a stick and eat it [...]. She would urinate in a 
basket she showed to everybody [...]. She would throw 
her habit into the latrines [...]. She would throw her habit 
and her coat [...]. She often laughed for no reason. [...] 
She would put raw meat in her nose and food inside her 
sleeve. [...] She would shout in hours of silence. 11
The case was submitted to two doctors who discussed 
it with other colleagues and whose testimony is admitted 
in evidence. Moreover, after interviewing her, two Jesuits 
declared her incapable of confessing and receiving the 
other sacraments requiring the use of reason. A Cistercian 
monk confirmed this opinion: instead of kneeling and 
confessing, Margarita spat and mocked the nuns. Two no-
taries sent by the Ordinary of Lisbon echoed these indi-
viduals’ assessment; they declared that she didn’t even 
know her own name 12.
Margarida’s case is an example of impaired con-
sciousness locked in an inner world to which documenta-
tion affords us no access. We can only observe her from 
the outside, in the strangeness of her actions. Her behav-
iour should have been a source of trouble for other nuns 
and disrupted the observance of rules, but testimonies 
show no reactions on the community’s part other than ru-
mours about her madness. It does not seem that the nuns 
laughed at her or were afraid of her13. There is no anguish 
in witness statements. None of them makes the slightest 
allusion to a supernatural cause behind Margarida’s state. 
They do not contemplate the possibility of demonic pos-
session or, conversely, of an excess of penitential fervour. 
It is a far cry from the “madness of the Cross” brought out 
by the Christian mysticism of the Renaissance14. Marga-
rida’s repugnant acts could not be included in the register 
of extreme penitential practices which were practiced in 
certain convents. In order to afflict their senses, certain 
descalced Spanish Carmelites willingly ate the vermin of 
spoiled food or the sputum of the sick, or disfigured them-
selves by rubbing their faces with waste15. These penanc-
es, however extreme, were nevertheless relatively codi-
fied and avoided scatology; they belonged to a conventual 
framework which was not that of the Cistercian nobles of 
Odivelas but that of a spiritual elite dedicated to the Cath-
olic Reformation, and they fell within an internally con-
sistent understanding of sanctity and sin. 
In fact, even in the descriptions given by witnesses, 
Margarida’s madness is fully grasped by law, described 
and understood from legal notions. The clinical picture 
appears only through this filter. Even before presenting 
a summary of testimonies, Francesco Cantucci of Peru-
gia, the rapporteur for this case, stresses the difficulty of 
this case and raises the question of evidence of mental 
disorders:
As a matter of fact, although rage or dementia is invisi-
ble, for it cannot be perceived by the bodily senses but 
by judgment of the intellect (even if it exists in reality), 
to prove it, an insightful investigation is consequently 
required because witnesses can easily make mistakes 
and should not be believed unless they justify their as-
sertions.16
The Auditors’ mission was to determine Margarida’s 
legal capacity, in this case her capacity to vow perpetual 
commitment to obedience, chastity and poverty. The use 
of reason was indeed an absolute necessity for the free 
exercise of consent and the creation of the irrevocable 
binding obligation between the nun and the community or 
the order that welcomed her17. Roman law had already es-
tablished a difference between madness punctuated by 
periods of clear-sightedness and permanent madness. The 
madman (furiosus) was seized upon by the law precisely 
because he was incapable of managing his property or 
contracting any obligation and, being potentially danger-
ous to others, he had to be protected by a guardian. Only 
permanent madness brought about the furiosus’s irrespon-
sibility, since he was never able to manifest his will. On 
the contrary, he who was mad only occasionally could re-
tain legal responsibility linked to these intervals of lucid-
ity18. The Auditors therefore had to strive to identify mad-
ness correctly. This required a complex operation 
whereby the subject’s words and actions were observed 
and then interpreted and classified into categories set by 
lawyers. “Outward signs indicate the secrets of the soul,” 
proclaimed the medieval commentators of Roman law19. 
Cantucci recalls examples of signs of dementia given by 
doctors: talking laughingly, throwing stones, throwing 
oneself into the sea, no longer knowing one’s own name 
or what one does or doesn’t want, and being incapable of 
articulate speech. Gestures or verbal expressions, actions 
which are not necessarily signs of madness in themselves, 
become so when they form a whole, completed by reputa-
tion: he “whom all commonly consider mad or insane is a 
madman”20.
Physicians’ opinion was not decisive; it was weighed 
up among a series of conjectures and signs. At a time 
when psychopathology did not exist, the practice of fo-
rensic medicine remained subordinate to the authority of 
legal experts. While Paolo Zacchia, the author of Ques-
tiones medico-legales (1621-1651), may be considered to 
have liberated forensic medicine from the hegemony of 
lawyers, it must be emphasised that Zacchia places great 
emphasis on the Roman Rota’s decisions among the au-
thorities he drew upon. In his appendix, he published a 
hundred decisions and those of Auditor Cantucci con-
cerning the profession of Margarida are among the first in 
the corpus21. In the creation of a semiology of madness, 
legal experts came before medical examiners22. 
For the Auditors of the Rota, the opinion of the two 
Jesuits and the Cistercian carried much more authority 
than that of physicians. These priests had accompanied 
Margarida in the examination of her own conscience to 
prepare herself for confession, and had found her incapa-
ble of doing so. They were in the best position to know 
whether she was capable of discerning good and evil, an 
ability without which an individual was not responsible 
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for his actions. Since the 12th century, the Church had dis-
tinguished two scenarios in which individual acts were 
examined: the external forum, that is the courts where the 
justice of men resolved disputes and judged crimes and 
offences; and the internal forum or forum of conscience, 
where the priest, in confession, judged sins before God 
and imposed penances ordained for reparation and salva-
tion. An entire store of knowledge had developed with the 
rise of the sacrament of penance; it circulated in the Tri-
dentine period in the textbooks of confessors, collections 
of cases of conscience and treatises on moral theology. 
But the forum of conscience was not considered the place 
of inner monologue, of the free flight of intimate thoughts. 
It was defined as the space of consciousness as judged by 
an external eye, God, represented by the confessor. The 
judicialisation of the forum of conscience is the hallmark 
of this period23. The internal forum, like the judicial one, 
presupposed the free exercise of the subject’s will. Yet the 
madman remained detached from himself; he could nei-
ther judge his own actions nor govern his conduct. Ac-
cording to these notions, it is logical that confessors 
should be considered more qualified than physicians to 
evaluate Margarida’s mental state. 
Despite this accumulation of concordant data, the Au-
ditors advanced cautiously. The objections of the oppos-
ing party, who contested Margarida’s madness in order to 
keep her in the monastery, needed still to be resisted. Ac-
cording to this other series of testimonies, she was able to 
read, sew and paint when she was at La Esperança, which 
may indicate that her mental derangement was only inter-
mittent, and that she had thus been able to pronounce her 
vows in a valid manner. However, the Auditors responded 
that it was impossible to conclude that the nun was clear-
headed at intervals from a discontinuous vision of sepa-
rate actions: this would entail establishing that her mental 
health had been maintained over an extended period. Nor 
was the fact that Margarida pronounced the three canoni-
cal vows like any other nun decisive proof of her mental 
health. What ultimately carried the decision of the Rota 
was the general picture. They placed together the state-
ments of experts (priests and physicians) and what was 
known about her words and gestures, but also the anoma-
lies of her curriculum, her dismissal by La Esperança and 
her hurried novitiate at Odivelas. Furthermore, while 
Margarita’s behaviour was pathological, her family em-
bodied rationality for they wanted to save the lineage’s 
good reputation and release it from a cumbersome burden 
by locking the young woman in a convent. Eventually, it 
seems that it was the doggedness of her family that se-
cured the Auditors’ conviction offering them clear proof 
of Margarita’s madness.
STORIES Of LOVE AND REPULSION
Demands for annulment of marriage based on the 
ground of fear also led the Auditors to scrutinise the feel-
ings and wishes of individuals. Under the influence of 
fear, an individual could act against his inner desire, con-
ceal his feelings, and mask his refusal and grief under the 
guise of satisfaction and joy. Fear muddied the waters. As 
the famous canonist Balde de Ubaldis remarked in the 
14th century,
The will subjected to fear is, in a sense, in gestation; im-
pure, it mixes disagreement with consent, and some-
times with a negative assertion. Indeed, it has a facade 
of consent, but internally a refusal, so that the heart of 
man is divided into two parts whereby one wants and 
the other refuses; the first manifests on the surface, the 
second is reality. 24
However, in the canonical approach of consent to 
marriage, the saying “constrained consent is consent” did 
not apply. On the contrary, consent was to be freely given 
by man and woman, otherwise the sacrament was consid-
ered null. Judges were thus invited to discern the real will 
of the individual, under affected consent. However, I shall 
show here that the truth which arose from examining the 
case was judicial truth, that which the court established 
from signs and conjectures in the inability to penetrate 
consciences and hearts. I shall analyse two cases which 
reflect very contrasting situations.
In 1607-1609, the Roman Rota studied the demand of 
one individual referred to in the documents as “the Mar-
quise of Alcalá”, doña Antonia Portocarrero y Cardenas. 
Married to don Felipe de Guzman y Aragón when she 
wanted to marry don Francisco de Zuñiga, she filed a 
claim for the annulment of her marriage on the grounds 
that she had married for fear of her father. Alessandro 
Ludovisi of Bologna, Auditor of the Rota since 1599 who 
in 1621 became Pope Gregory XV, was the rapporteur of 
the case. He restored part of the family history, but only 
what was necessary for the work of the Tribunal. The six 
decisions he drafted in this case overlook the names and 
functions of the main parties involved, as well as the sub-
stance of political and financial issues surrounding the 
marriage. They do not say why don Pedro López Porto-
carrero, 1st Marquis of Alcalá de la Alameda, wanted to 
unite his heiress Antonia to the second son of the 7th Duke 
of Medina Sidonia, while the girl had (apparently) given 
her heart to don Francisco de Zuñiga, the eldest son of the 
1st Marquis of Villamanrique. Antonia’s deceased mother, 
doña Elvira de Cardenas y Toledo, was the heir of don 
Gómez de Cardenas y Figueroa de Toledo, 2nd lord of 
Lobón. On the other hand, the evidence on file tells us 
that during the marriage negotiations, Antonia tried to 
pass on a letter to Francisco written in her own hand, 
where she pledged to marry him while lamenting that she 
had to marry Felipe. However, the paper fell into her fa-
ther’s hands who flew into a terrible rage, to the point that 
Antonia denied writing it. Don Pedro (again according to 
testimonies) threatened to disinherit his daughter, or al-
most: he could not deprive her of the majorat established 
by his ancestors, but he could content himself with trans-
ferring this majorat as it was without the substantial in-
crease he had planned. To these paternal threats was add-
ed pressure from Antonia’s mother-in-law, doña Francisca 
Enríquez de Gúzman, and a priest known by the family. 
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Separated from her usual confessor, the young heiress 
was kept under guard in her father’s home and even pre-
vented from going to church. She had, however, found a 
way to ask the Archbishop of Seville (don Rodrigo de 
Castro) for a brief from the apostolic nuncio prohibiting 
marriage. Far from helping him, the archbishop, a friend 
of her father’s, had exhorted her to submit, making him-
self complicit in unauthorised consent. The sacrament 
was finally celebrated at night, behind closed doors, and 
by proxy in order to expedite the case’s conclusion. After 
this, Antonia was taken from Seville to the castle of Coria 
for the consummation of the marriage.
This Sevillian case represented a situation well known 
to the Auditors of the Rota and ecclesiastical judges more 
generally: that of a young girl (sometimes a young man) 
whose family (often the father, but this could be the 
brother, the mother or even the grandmother) pushed into 
marrying or entering into religion for various reasons 
which all sacrificed the individual to the group. These in-
cluded building an alliance with a prestigious family, op-
timising the use of the house’s financial resources and in-
creasing its honour by entering one of its members into a 
reputed religious establishment25. The Auditors’ objective 
was to know the Marquise’s state of mind (animus), when 
procedure did not allow them to question her directly. As 
was their wont, they had to rely on testimonies gathered 
from relatives by both parties. As in the case of Margari-
da, the document allows us to approach Antonia’s interi-
ority through categories of law only, but it nevertheless 
also uses the language of feelings. The emotion she felt 
about her marriage to Felipe was “repulsion and repug-
nance”; her state of mind was “foreign and contrary” to 
this union. The signs of this repugnance were, according 
to witnesses, “the continual complaints and protests” with 
which she swore never to marry Felipe26. It is not certain 
that she was in love with Francisco or even wished to 
marry him because, according to some witnesses, she 
hadn’t written her letter so much to marry Francisco as to 
try to escape the marriage with Felipe. We do not know 
the cause of her deep aversion towards this marriage: was 
Felipe ugly or disagreeable? Would she, her parents’ only 
heiress, prefer to marry the elder of a lineage and not a 
junior, were he even the son of the richest man among the 
Great of Spain? These questions were not relevant to the 
work of the Rota Auditors. There is another series of indi-
cations about Antonia’s feelings during the marriage – 
she complained and said she was married against her will 
– and afterwards: “the great sadness and inconsolable af-
fliction shown by the Marquise, her tears and the loud 
cries she uttered while driving her from Seville to the cas-
tle of Coria to ratify the marriage, so that she was disfig-
ured by sadness and forced them all to weep with her” 27.
Our third case, Coimbra’s marriage, was fraught with 
disputes. Six successive decisions between December 
1614 and March 1618 gave precise information. The rap-
porteur of this Portuguese case was Matteo Buratto of 
Bologna and a successor of Ludovisi to the Rota. Little is 
said of the plaintiff (actor), Manuel, except that his only 
income amounted to 600 ducats, derived from profits of 
the military order of Saint-Lazare. His lover Branca (his 
adversary before the Rota), widowed by two successive 
husbands, had two already adolescent sons, Antonio and 
Francisco, as well as a girl presented in documents only 
through her husband Filipe. One can therefore surmise 
that Branca was more or less over forty, and that Filipe 
was older than his brothers-in-law because he appears as 
the leader of the group. Manuel and Branca had had an 
affair that led them to get engaged. The engagement had 
been celebrated at night before some servants, at Branca’s 
house in Assafarge, a town near Coimbra. Discretion was 
necessary because this engagement and, moreover, the 
marriage risked Manuel losing his ecclesiastical income. 
Manuel had, however, submitted a request to the Roman 
Curia to consolidate this possession and be able to marry. 
This prudent plan was thwarted by Branca’s sons and 
son-in-law, who harboured strong hostility towards Ma-
nuel. 
The wedding scene is reported in detail. On the eve of 
San Sebastián (on the evening of 19 January; the year is 
not specified), Blanca sent a servant to Manuel, in Coim-
bra, asking him to come as a matter of urgency. Once he 
arrived at his mistress’s, and then found himself naked in 
bed with her, he looked on as Antonio, Francisco, and Fil-
ipe appeared accompanied by male and female servants. 
Filipe was armed with a sword and a harquebus. The 
three men demanded that Manuel marry his mistress im-
mediately, and for this reason they summoned the parish 
priest on the pretext that Branca was seriously ill. Not-
withstanding his entreaties to postpone the marriage in 
order to preserve his income from the Church, Manuel 
had to comply immediately on Filipe’s orders. In the ear-
ly morning, Manuel left the house to go to his friends and 
to the Bishop of Coimbra (don Alfonso de Castelo Bran-
co), before bringing the matter before the judge of For-
mosinha and alleging that the marriage had been forced 
upon him through fear. Auditor Buratto’s decisions still 
mentioned the inequality of wealth (despite equality of 
nobility) and the difference in age between Manuel and 
Blanca, and the doubt the groom’s lawyers tried to instill 
about Blanca’s good behaviour after the betrothal – but 
the Rota refused to authorise an on-the-spot investigation 
to verify this last allegation.
This affair concerned a noble widow who openly 
maintained a loving connection with a man which was 
not prepared to marry her. As he invoked his financial po-
sition so as to avoid marriage, she arranged to enforce it. 
The testimonies record the affects of the various main 
parties unevenly. Branca is the defendant, but there is no 
direct evidence of her feelings. In the fourteen letters 
written by Manuel, which are on record, Auditor Buratto 
had carefully counted seven instances of Branca’s beauty 
being praised, but her only recorded words are those of 
the engagement vows with Manuel. Witnesses on her be-
half reported that she provided for Manuel’s food and 
welfare on a daily basis, behaving according to was, at 
this time, expected of a devoted wife. When Manuel had 
issued her his dimissorial letters (documents necessary 
for the receipt of religious orders), she had torn and 
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burned them, which according to Buratto indicated that 
Manuel no longer intended to enter the orders. The Audi-
tors did not examine the hypothesis that Branca, by de-
stroying these papers, cut off any possibility of renounc-
ing he whom she and all the servants considered her 
husband28. However, the Auditors suspected Branca and 
the young men of her family were complicit in the trap 
laid for Manuel: as the door of the room was not locked, 
it seemed likely that she had facilitated her son-in-law’s 
and sons’ entry. It was also she who suggested that Filipe 
tell the parish priest “that she was ill and ask to confess so 
that he would come more readily.29” The three men’s mo-
tives were clear: they wanted to defend Branca’s honour 
and, through her, their own honour by compelling the 
lover to marry his mistress. In their eyes, Branca did not 
have free control over her body. Her affair with Manuel 
was to be consecrated by marriage. Their prevailing senti-
ment was at first “enmity” towards Manuel – they refused 
to greet him and talk to him – and then “anger and indig-
nation” when they intruded into the room. 
The file is centered on Manuel’s affects because three 
of the man’s feelings were decisive for the judicial settle-
ment of the case: his love for Branca, the fear experienced 
at the time of the marriage, and then the anger that led 
him to reject this union. From the passionate love letters 
from Manuel to Branca, lawyers coldly extracted all pas-
sages which proved that the relationship was strong and 
that it was solemnised in a pledge of marriage:
In the second and tenth [letter], he says he is her hus-
band, and Branca his wife. In the fourth, he still has the 
thirst, the appetite, and the desire to be in Branca’s arms, 
where he hopes to live and die, etc., which is the only 
thing he always asks of God; and at the end he says that 
he will never cease to be her lover and husband. In the 
sixth, he prays that God might preserve Branca in the 
constancy she has often promised and sworn to him: 
which corroborates the witnesses’ testimony on the en-
gagement vows.30
In the Auditors’ eyes, Manuel’s fear that fateful night 
arose from circumstances: naked in bed, he was threat-
ened by angry armed men. He stuttered his way through 
his marriage vows, to the point that Filipe had to order 
him to articulate correctly. Finally, he remained silent 
when the parish priest asked the spouses if they were hap-
py after the exchange of the words of consent to marriage, 
and he left the house “in a bad mood.” 
The Rota’s proceedings did not provide further insight 
into how the feelings, emotions and intentions of the main 
parties were directly expressed. It was nevertheless nec-
essary to expose them because the case, as in the Mar-
quise of Alcalá’s one, is centred on the notion of fear (me-
tus). If Antonia and Manuel had consented to marriage 
through fear and not freely, it must have resulted in the 
sacrament being null and void. However, although fear is 
classically defined by lawyers as “mental agitation” 
(mentis trepidatio) at the idea of  a present or future dan-
ger31, the Auditors did not analyse this emotion in its psy-
chic and physiological effects, but only to show that the 
individual’s capacity to give free consent had been al-
tered. Fear had gripped Antonia when her father discov-
ered her letter to Francisco, and, in order to placate her 
father’s fury, had led her to lie, to say that she had not 
written this letter; fear clasped Manuel’s throat and stifled 
his voice when he uttered the vows “I take you as my 
wife…”. For the Auditors, Antonia’s denials and Ma-
nuel’s mumblings were signs that they translated into the 
language of the law.
EVIDENCE Of CONSTRAINT
The fear in question here is in fact a concept rooted in 
Roman canonical law. Experienced by an individual, it is 
associated with the violence committed by a third party of 
which fear is the result. In Roman law, constraint and fear 
(vis et metus) could bring about a claim for restitution, 
provided that fear is “such that it affects a stable man” 
(cadens in constantem virum), that is to say, an adult male 
individual of average mental and physical strength, and 
neither cowardly nor particularly heroic. It was against 
what the typical man could bear that judges assessed, on a 
case-by-case basis, whether the plaintiff could resist pres-
sure and violence. Developed in the Digest, this notion 
was taken up in canonical law to the point that one title of 
the Decretals of Gregory IX (X.1.40) was dedicated to it. 
Judges exercised their arbitration power to assess whether 
the fear was justified, and therefore whether the resulting 
act was valid or vitiated. They examined the circumstanc-
es, the individual’s ability to resist, the capacity of who-
ever inflicted fear to cause harm, and the type of con-
straint used (threats, blows, pressures, intimidation)32. 
After the Council of Trent, canonists endeavoured to or-
ganise and coordinate the law of the Church and com-
ment on and disseminate standards stemming from the 
Council33. They gave new focus to the question of con-
sent and all the problems associated with the notion of 
fear. In 1600 in Seville, Baltasar Mogollón, a jurist from 
Caceres, published the first systematic treatise devoted to 
fear in its legal sense34 – a very austere work that Auditor 
Buratto mentions in one of his decisions on the case of 
Coimbra35, and was republished in 1623. Mogollón’s 
work was followed by the treatise of Antonio Cabreros 
Avendaño36, dedicated to the Duke of Olivares. The 
Madrilenian Cabreros Avendaño also undertook to define 
fear in a methodical way but mobilised a large body of 
literary sources from Antiquity, which opened up his 
book to a wider audience than Mogollón’s. Despite the 
interest in Mogollón’s book, the treatise De Sancto Matri-
monio of Jesuit Tomás Sánchez of Cordoba, published in 
1602 (with fourteen editions in the following half centu-
ry), and of which Book 4 dealt with forced consent, 
quickly became the reference on the subject37. The provi-
sions of the Council of Trent concerning the freedom of 
consent of nuns also simulated reflection on fear and con-
straint, which were grounds on which women and girls 
could challenge the validity of their religious profession. 
The Manuale Praelatorum regularium, by the Franciscan 
Luis Miranda, is an example38. Moreover, forced profes-
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sion concerned men, as evidenced by the collection of le-
gal advice issued by the famous canonist Martin de Azpil-
cueta “Navarro”, notably in the last stage of his career in 
Rome between 1567 and 158639. In the extensive litera-
ture on legal advice (consilia), it is precisely here where 
questions concerning acts committed under duress and 
factors tainting freedom of consent developed remarkably 
during this period. 
In this field, it seems that the decisions of the Roman 
Rota have played a major role in consolidating doctrine 
and resolving various issues. The decisions of Auditor 
Ludovisi in the case of the Marquise of Alcalá show that 
it was not simply a matter of resolving a specific case, but 
also of providing the canonists with a solid theoretical 
foundation on the relationship between consent and con-
straint. The fifty-point summary of decision 326 of 18 
June 1607 declares that Ludovisi uses the marchioness’ 
case to provide a systematic presentation on the theme of 
fear, dealing with the difficulties and means of providing 
evidence of constraint, the specific features of reverential 
fear (as defined below), the principles by which judges 
should assess levels of constraint, the circumstances that 
might presuppose the exercise of constraint, and the num-
ber and quality of witnesses admitted into the system of 
evidence40. Ludovisi continued with decision 352 of 28 
January 1608 which dealt with the quality of eligible wit-
nesses in proving that a marriage had been granted under 
duress41. Decision 374 of 23 June 1608 provided informa-
tion on the evidence and conjecture which could prove 
constraint had been imposed and the difficult problem of 
the level of constraint from which it could be assumed a 
woman in particular had consented out of fear42. The prin-
cipal theme of decision 392 of 15 December 1608 was the 
“purging” of fear, that is to say, the interval beyond which 
it could be presumed that constraint ceased to be exer-
cised, and that the individual had thus regained the capac-
ity to express his consent freely. The summary set out the 
principle whereby judges should assume that constraint 
was at play as long as the person who inflicted it was still 
alive; there was therefore no fixed time limit. This provi-
sion removed any appearance based probative value 
which might imply that the individual under duress had 
finally accepted the situation: “As long as the cause of 
fear persists, whatever he might do, even if he demon-
strates his free consent and his happy and joyous mood, 
fear cannot be deemed to be purged” 43. In the decision of 
26 January 1609, Ludovisi posited the equally essential 
principle that a nullified marriage could not be validated a 
posteriori by a simple agreement or “ratification”, but 
had to be celebrated in all the forms required by the 
Council of Trent: this meant that forced marriage was 
considered completely null and void44. Finally, the last 
decision in the series, number 414 dated 5 June 1609, set 
out the grounds on which the Auditors refused a remisso-
ria, that is, the authorisation to conduct a further investi-
gation on the site of the dispute. In this case, Felipe had 
called for further investigation in the hope of delaying the 
trial; he also alleged that he had not been kept informed 
of the Marquise’s legal action45. This decision was impor-
tant for it added to the case law of the Rota. This served 
to postpone one of the parties’ ultimate delaying tactics at 
a time when a case had already been the subject of several 
deliberations and was approaching its conclusion.
To a lesser extent, Auditor Buratto also regulated the 
matter of fear and constraint in a systematic way. Thus, 
Filipe’s armed entry into the room where Manuel and 
Blanca lay gives rise to three normative statements in the 
summary of decision 213: “The terror of weapons arouses 
the just fear of death or corporal punishment. The fear 
generated by the terror of weapons does not subside even 
if they are not used or put down, as long as they can be 
easily taken up again. The fear produced by the terror of 
weapons is highly conductive to annulling a marriage” 46. 
This point had already been addressed by Tomás Sán-
chez, who affirmed that the terror of weapons is a fear 
“such that it affects a stable man” even if those who carry 
them did not make use of them47; likewise, Ludovisi had 
stressed that the armed servants’ presence at the time of 
marriage was likely to frighten the Marquise48. Buratto 
mentioned these two texts in his own development and, in 
turn, helped to consolidate jurisprudence on this point. 
The mere presence of weapons, without direct assault or 
threat, could be invoked before the Rota to request the 
annulment of a marriage. 
The major issue raised by the Marquise of Alcalá’s 
case was that of so-called “reverential fear” (metus rever-
entialis) as a ground for annulling the marriage. Mo-
gollón had not defined what reverence was, but gave a 
general norm (“reverence is due to every superior”) 49, 
and then set out specific cases: a wife owes reverence to 
her husband, a son to his father and mother, descendants 
to their ascendants, a servant to his master, a youth to his 
elders, etc. If reverence was manifested generally by an 
attitude of respect, in certain cases it also included the 
possibility of receiving punishment as the husband, fa-
ther, master or abbot possessed the right to correct their 
wife, children, servants, students or monks. Reverential 
fear, thus, was instilled by a superior to an inferior, by 
virtue of this power of constraint. Mogollón referred to 
the doctors’ debate on the effects of reverential fear, un-
derstood as a ground for judicial action: was a superior’s 
mere presence sufficient to instill “just fear” (that is, fear 
affecting freedom of consent) or should it be accompa-
nied by threats and blows? His own opinion was that the 
mere presence of the person instilling fear was sufficient 
for the other one to invoke this ground (otherwise, threats 
and blows had to be invoked), especially if the following 
conditions were met: the act concerned two persons 
bound by an obligation of reverence, for example a girl 
who was about to be married and lived with her father; 
the individual instilling fear was known to threaten or 
strike his inferiors; the damage committed was extremely 
serious. Mogollón concluded that reverential fear could 
be legitimately invoked by men and women, even in spir-
itual cases (thus religious profession); and that it was thus 
an impediment to free consent, so that tacit consent given 
in the presence of whoever instilled reverential fear could 
be appealed50. Sánchez’s conclusions were less clear-cut. 
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The Jesuit tended to consider that reverential fear was not 
enough to amount to constraint “such that it affects a sta-
ble man” if not accompanied by threats and blows51. Nev-
ertheless, he encouraged careful consideration of the cir-
cumstances, the character of the father and of the child, 
and the intensity and repetition of the pressures exerted52. 
For the Rota, the Marquise of Alcalá’s affair combined 
the classic features of reverential fear which, as the Audi-
tors found decisive, included Antonia’s complaints and 
protests. While there was no question of death threats or 
serious ill-treatment, the Auditors felt that a woman was 
more likely to be frightened than a man, and that it was 
enough that the fear be “such that it affects a stable wom-
an”. They used the possibility opened by Sánchez of tak-
ing into account reverential fear even if not accompanied 
by threats or blows. The marriage of doña Antonia Porto-
carrero y Cardenas with don Felipe de Guzmán y Aragón 
was annulled, which allowed her to marry don Pedro 
Girón de Ribera in 1611. It may therefore be considered 
that this case’s outcome was a decisive step in taking into 
account the will of young people and, consequently, that 
the Roman Rota thus showed its willingness to put a limit 
on the strategic alliances of heads of aristocratic houses – 
findings that our research in progress, more specifically 
focused on the sociological aspect of this episode, will 
put to the test.
In the Portuguese case, it was a question of whether 
the Tribunal could consider that the marriage had been 
contracted under duress when Manuel was the lover of 
Branca and even her fiancé, as his letters and testimonies 
showed. In this type of “marriage by force” (matrimoni-
um meticulosum), the man usually held a higher social 
position than the woman, and promised to marry her for 
her to consent to sexual intercourse; the woman’s family 
managed to catch the two lovers in the act, if necessary 
by setting a trap for the seducer; the aim was to safeguard 
family honour53. Between marriage and the threat of a 
vengeful death, the man chose the first outcome as a less-
er evil. The requirement of free consent, laid down by ca-
nonical law, then allowed him to contest the validity of 
the commitment thus contracted. He then had to prove 
before the judges that the constraint he had experienced 
was “such that it affects a stable man”, which implied that 
he had been in imminent danger of death or injury, that he 
had been confronted by persons who were genuinely 
menacing in their attitude or character, that he had had no 
opportunity to flee, and that he had exhibited real terror54. 
Coimbra’s case was thus atypical in terms of the profile of 
the main parties involved, their respective ages and their 
social positions.
Legal theories on consent and constraint, as well as 
the Rota’s previous decisions concerning similar cases, 
provided the lens through which the Auditors read ex-
tracts of testimonies and arguments presented by both 
parties. Thus the Marquis of Alcalá is presented as terri-
ble, hard and irascible in character, and therefore capable 
of frightening his daughter. What does it matter that other 
witnesses described him as an ordinarily placid man? An-
tonia’s lawyers presented him as a man who would be-
come angry when contradicted55. A father and Castilian 
nobleman such as the Marquis was certainly accustomed 
to being obeyed unswervingly and exercising his right of 
correction over his dependents; one can especially as-
sume that he was eager to realise his plan to marry his 
heiress to the Duke of Medina Sidonia’s youngest. How-
ever, the Auditors were not interested in the Marquis’s 
plans and did not seek to know more about who the man 
was. The essential point was that the Marquis described 
by the witnesses corresponds to the model of severe, rig-
id, authoritarian and angry father or husband, ready to ex-
ecute his threats, which are found in other cases judged 
by the Rota and other tribunals56. Lawyers sometimes had 
to adjust the content of testimonies or the requirements of 
provisional arguments. Thus, in general, the threat of 
deprivation of property could be seen as pressure to im-
pair freedom of consent; but the Marquise was in no dan-
ger of suffering from hunger and poverty, for her father 
could only threaten not to increase her majorat since he 
had no power to change the rules for conferring it. This 
threat was, however, used as evidence by the Marquise’s 
lawyers57, who portrayed the opposition between respect-
ful, fearful girl deprived of any means of appeal, and her 
imperious, menacing father seconded by the insistent 
pressures of her stepmother58. Similarly, the Portuguese 
case showed a man frightened by three angry men burst-
ing into the room where he lay naked in bed with his mis-
tress, a typical picture of matrimonium meticulosum. All 
the same, one clearly sees that Manuel, despite his fear, 
had maintained composure to ask for a delay in evoking 
his ecclesiastical benefits, that the next day he went to ex-
plore the legal remedies against his marriage with a beau-
tiful, rich, honourable and beloved woman, and that he 
had been careful not to set foot in her house so that no one 
could claim that the fear had been “purged”. Finally, what 
convinced the Auditors were not only Manuel’s “great re-
pulsion” of marrying in these unpleasant circumstances 
but also the length of the legal proceedings, first in Portu-
gal, then in Rome for four long years, his obstinacy in 
asking for the marriage to be annulled and, in addition, 
the age difference with his mistress. Without particularly 
examining Manuel’s intimate feelings, the Auditors 
thought it unlikely that he wanted to marry her. At this 
point, only the archival documents give the key of the 
story. According to one of Branca’s lawyers, Manuel de 
Meneses had met Branca de Baredo as he had come to 
negotiate with her the marriage between Filipe de Sousa, 
his grandson, and the widow’s daughter, Francisca Dessa. 
“But after the conclusion of the marriage, he, Don Manu-
el, remained captive of his love for Branca and began to 
speak about marrying her.”59 According to the criteria of 
the time, the difference of age was acceptable when the 
woman was much younger than the husband, but not 
when she was his grandson’s mother-in-law. 
There is an adage by the canonists which goes “the 
Church does not adjudicate hidden matters” 60. The Audi-
tors of the Rota could only adjudicate on the basis of 
signs suggesting the absence or refusal of consent, pres-
sure and threat. To this end, they had to translate into 
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signs words of varying degrees of explicitness (com-
plaints and protests), but also objects (weapons), the cir-
cumstances of time (the night, the passing of years) and 
place (a closed room), bodily manifestations (tears, stam-
mering and sighing, pallor, hardening of the face) and a 
whole series of actions which, in isolation, would not 
have been significant but which, when connected to each 
other, made up a story. With this information, the Audi-
tors exposed a truth which nonetheless remained probable 
rather than absolutely certain. In other words, documenta-
tion of the Rota provides no window on the secret of 
hearts and neither reveals the depths of consciences – 
which is beside its purpose. It is therefore fascinating to 
study the way in which the Tribunal approached the ques-
tion of consent from outside that intimate part of individ-
uals. Moreover, the judicial perspective remained closed 
in on itself. Therefore, nor do the Rota’s decisions assist 
in understanding the strategies of the main parties in-
volved as social actors, or in realising the stakes involved 
in the three cases analysed here respecting the heritages, 
reputation and social trajectory of the families con-
cerned61. On the other hand, one cannot help but be struck 
by the contrast between the two approaches of consent 
referred to at the beginning of this article. In the area of 
baptism and conversion, the theological and legal princi-
ples prohibited any procedure for the verification a poste-
riori of consent and any possibility of reversal, so that 
judges’ know-how in building evidence based on words, 
circumstances and bodily language was not used to study 
cases of forced baptism and pronounce their annulment, 
but to detect the heretical and deviant behaviour of con-
verts and their descendants.
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12 (Bordoni, 1665: 498).
13 On these reactions to madness, see (Carrera, 2010a: 6; Carrera, 
2010b; Lopez Poza, 2006).
14 (Foucault, 1972: 42-43).
15 (Roullet, 2015: 92-101, 233).
16 « Nam licet furor sive dementia sit quid invisibile, quod non 
sensu coporis, sed iudicio intellectus percipitur, etiamsi in facto 
consistat, et propterea in eius probationes perspicax inquisitio 
requiritur, quia teste facile possunt errare et ideo eis non credi-
tur, nisi causam sui dicto manifestam faciant », (Bordoni, 1665: 
497).
17 (Bordoni, 1665: 290).
18 Vallar (2016).
19 « Exteriora indicant secreta animi », (Boari, 1983: 32).
20 « Furor ostenditur in eo qui… communiter ab omnibus reputat-
ur pro furioso vel demente », (Bordoni, 1665: 498; Boari, 1983: 
60-71).
21 (Zacchia, 1621: 143-146, 147-148). On Zacchia (1621); Pastore 
and Rossi (2008). 
22 (Boari, 1983: 14).
23 (Turrini, 1991; Prodi, 2001).
24 « Est enim meticulosa voluntas, praegenerans, impura, et mul-
tiplicans quendam dissensum cum consensu, et quandam cum 
affirmative negationem ; habet enim in superficie volitionem, in 
medulla nolitionem, et scinditur cor hominis in duas partes, et 
una pars est velle, altera non velle ; prima superficialis, secun-
da realis », (Balde de Ubaldis, 1615: 120). 
25 For examples of forced marriages in Venice, see (Cristellon, 
2010: 241-248); on matrimonial strategies in the Spanish aris-
tocracy, see (Soria Mesa, 2007: 115-212).
26 ( Ludovisi, 1622: 353).
27 « Apertissime demonstrant maxima tristitia, et inconsolabilis 
afflictio, qua Marchionissa afficiebatur, ploratus et maximi 
clamores quos emittebat, dum ex civitate Hispalensi duceretur 
ad oppidum de Coria ad ratificandum matrimonium, ita ut ipsa 
prae nimia tristitia facta fuisset valde difformis, et omnes 
cogeret a collachrymandum », (Ludovisi, 1622: 357). 
28 (Buratto, 1660: 177-178).
29 « Et illico vocatus fuit Parochus de ordine Philippi, suggerente 
Blancha, ut ei diceretur, qui illa aegrotabat, et confessionem 
petebat, ut facilius veniret », (Buratto, 1660: 101).
30 « In secunda, et decima profitetur et nominat se maritum, et 
Blancham uxorem. In quarta dicit, habere semper eandem si-
tim, appetitum, et desiderium, esse in brachis Blanchae, in qui-
bus sperat vivere et mori, etc., quod hoc est solum, quod semper 
a Deo petiturus est; et in fine dicit, quod nunquam futurum erat, 
ut desineret esse illius amator et maritus. In sexta Deum rogat, 
ut Blancham conservet in firmitate, quam totiens illi promisit et 
juravit: quod multum coadjuvat depositionem supradictum tes-
tium super juramento sponsalium », (Buratto, 1660: 177).
31 Digeste, 4.2.1.
32 Marchetto (2001).
33 (Fantappiè, 2008: 17-30).
34 Mogollón (1600).
35 (Buratto, 1660: 103).
36 Cabreros Avendaño (1634).
37 Tomás Sánchez, Disputationum de sancto matrimonio, Genuae, 
apud Iosephum Pavonem (1602: 681-816). For further readings 
on Sánchez, see Alfieri (2010); on Sánchez and consent, see 
(Noonan, 1972: 31-40).
38 (Miranda, 1612: 168-169).
39 Martin de Azpilcueta Navarro (1600); for a biographical survey 
of Navarro, see Lavenia (2003).
40 (Ludovisi, 1622: 352).
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41 (Ludovisi, 1622: 387).
42 (Ludovisi, 1622: 414).
43 « Quamdiu enim durat causa metus, quicumque actus fiat, 
etiamsi praeferat liberam voluntatem et laetum, jucundum ani-
mum, nedum metum non purgat », (Ludovisi, 1622: 433-434).
44 (Ludovisi, 1622: 435).
45 (Ludovisi, 1622: 457-458).
46 « Metum justum mortis, vel corporis cruciatus, inducit armo-
rum terror. Metus incussus ex armorum terrore non cessat ex 
illorum non usu, imo neque ex depositione, quando de facili re-
assumi possunt. Metus incussus ex armorum terrore plurimum 
operatur ad matrimonium annullandum », (Buratto, 1660: 263). 
47 (Sánchez, 1602: 699).
48 (Ludovisi, 1622: 444).
49 «Genericè dico, quod quilibet superiori debetur reverentia », 
(Mogollón, 1600: 59).
50 (Mogollón, 1600: 68-79).
51 (Sánchez, 1602: 708).
52 Marchetto (2006).
53 See, for instance, (Cristellon, 2010: 254-246).
54 For a case in 15th century Verona, see Marchetto (2001). 
55 (Ludovisi, 1622: 354).
56 Marchetto (2006).
57 (Ludovisi, 1622: 355).
58 (Ludivisi, 1622: 414-415).
59 «Cum D. Emanuel de Meneses ad tractando matrimonium pro 
D. Philippo de Sousa eius nepote cum D. Branca de Baredo vi-
dua pro D. Francisca Dessa filia sua […] matrimonium conclu-
sum fuit, ipse D. Emanuel remansit captus amore d. D. Brancha 
et tractavit eam in uxore ducere », Archivio di Stato di Roma, 
S. Rota Romana, vol. 1242, s.f.
60 Chiffoleau (2006). 
61 Our current research aims, precisely, to study different cases re-
garding constraint and consent in their multiple dimensions, us-
ing legal literature as well as archival documents. This paper 
presents the first results of this work. 
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